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CHANGE OF DOMICIL.
Domicil of origin is distinguished from
domicil of choice. Domicil of origin is the
domicil which every one receives at birth,
while domicil of choice is that which is ac-
quired by the voluntary act of the party.
Changes from domicil of origin to domicil of
choice, or from one domicil of choice to
another of choice, often involve important
and interesting inquiries, to some of which
attention is invited. In a former article I we
had occasion to consider the law of domicil
in its relaiion to married women, infants and
persons under guardianship. It then ap-
peared: 1. That a married woman could not
acquire a domicil of choice separate from that
of her husband-that her domicil could only
be changed by her husband, except in those
cases in which he had been guilty of such
dereliction of duty as to entitle her to a
divorce. 2. That an infant could not change
its domicil. That the domicil could only be
changed by the father in his life time, or the
mother during her widowhood. 3. It was
thought that the guardian could change the
domicil of the ward, if done with no fraudu-
lent intent. The consideration that was then
given to the subject makes it unnecessary to
enter into any discussion of changes of dom-
icil by persons belonging to the above classes,
and attention is called rather to changes of
domicil by persons who are sui juris.
The capacity of any person sui juris to
change his domicil being conceded, the ques-
tion presented is, under what circumstances is
a change considered to have been made. And
in the first place we find it laid down that no
person can be at any time without a domicil
somewhere. "It is," says Lord Westbury,
"a settled principle that no man shall be with-
out a domicil." In the same case Lord
Chelmsford said, "it is an undoubted fact
that no man can be without a domicil." 2 If
no man can be without a domicil, it neces-
sasily follows that the domicil of origin must
continue until a domicil of choice is acquired.
1 11 Cent. L. J. 421.
2 Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sc. App. 441, 457.
3 Udny v. Udny, supra; Bell v. Kennedy, L. R. 1
Se. App. 307, 820; and, see, Glover v. Glover, 18 Ala.
367; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 721; Sanderson
v. Ralston, 20 La. Ann. 312; Mithebll v. United States,
2 1 Wall. 350; Desmare v. United States, 93 U. S. 610;
One whose domicil of origin was in Jamaica,
after he came of age sold his estates in the
island and left, to use hi. own expression,
"for good." He then went to Scotland, re-
maining there for some time, but without
making up his mind whether to settle there or
not. The court of session held that he had
acquired a Scotch domicil, but the House of
Lords reversed their decision, holding that
notwithstanding he had abandoned Jamaica
"for good," his domicil still continued there,
as he had not as yet acquired one elsewhere.4
"It is impossible to predicate of him," so
it was said, "that he was a man who had a
fixed and settled purpose to make Scotland
his future place of residence, to set up his
tabernacle there, to make it his future home.
And unless you are able to show that, with
perfect -clearness and satisfaction to your-
selves, it follows that the domicil of origin
continues." The above case not only illus-
trates the principle that the domieil of origin
is retained until a new domicil is actually ac-
quired, but it shows that this principle holds
good even in those extreme cases in which a
party has finally abandoned the place of his
domicil with no intention of ever returning to
it again. We are, therefore, prepared to find
that the courts have, in numerous instances,
laid down the rule, that one's domicil is not
lost or changed by a mere temporary absence,
no matter how long continued, provided there
exists an animus revertendi.5 The doctrine
of the first principle, that domicil of origin
can not be lost by a final abandonment with
an intention of never returning, may be far-
ther illustrated by a case decided by the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi, where it was held
that if an invalid sells his homestead and
household property, and leaves his domicil of
origin for purposes of traveling so as to re-
gain his health or prolong his life, and shortly
after dies on his travels, without having ac-
quired any permanent abode at any place, the
Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me. 165, 176; Moore v. Wil-
kins, 10 N. H. 452, 456; Hood's Estate, 21 'a. St. 106;
Hindman's Appeal. 85 Pa. St. 466, 469; Kirkland v.
Whately, 4 Allen, 464; Bangs v. Brewster, 111 Mass.
385.
4 See Bell v. Kennedy, supra.
5 State v. Judge, 13 Ala. 805; Boyd v. Beck,
29 Ala. 703; Griffin v. Wall, 32 Ala. 149; Dow v.
Gould, etc. M. Co. 31 Cal. 629; Risewick v. Davis, 19
Md. 82; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 505, 523; Brad-
ley v. Lowry, 1 Speer's Eq. 3, 14; Case v. Clarke, 5
Mason, 70; State v. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383; Chariton
County v. Moberly, 59 Mo. 238.
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domicil of birth is not lost, although he had
no intention of ever returning to it.6 The
second principle above stated, that domicil is
not lost or changed by a mere temporary ab-
sence, may be illustrated by the well-known
case of Sears v. City of Boston, 7 decided by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
A native of Boston had left Massachusetts for
France. He took his family with him and
hired a house for a year in Paris, having
leased his own house and furniture, for a
year, in Boston. The court held that while
his residence was in Paris, his domicil con-
tinued to be in Boston, and said: "If the
departure from one's fixed and settled abode
is for a purpose in its nature temporary,
whether it be business or pleasure, accom-
panied with an intent of returning and re-
suming the former place of abode as soon as
such purpose is accomplished, in general,
such a person continues to be an inhabitant
at such place of abode, for all purposes of
enjoying civil and political privileges, and of
being subject to civil duties. Love v.
Cherry,8 decided by the Supreme Court of
Iowa in 1868, is an extreme case which well
illustrates tlis same doctrine. The facts of
the case were as follows: The plaintiff was,
in 1860, domiciled in Iowa. During the latter
part of that year she left Iowa for Texas, for
the purpose of visiting a daughter residing
there, and also hoping to collect, before her
return to Iowa, a sum of money due to her
from the estate of a deceased relative who
had died in Texas. Upon her arrival in Texas
she learned that the estate was unsettled, and
she thereupon determined to remain until she
could get the money which was coming to her.
About that time Texas passed an ordinance
of secession, and the rebellion breaking out,
it became difficult, if not impossible, for her
to return. In December, 1861, the adminis-
trator of the estate, in which she was inter-
ested, resigned and left the State, whereupon
she determined to take up her residence
there, and secure an appointment as adminis-
tratrix of the estate. She resided in Texas
until 1866, when she came North and resided
in Illinois, where she was still residing when
the action was commenced. She had thus
a Still v. Woodville, 38 Miss. 646.
7 1 Met. 250.
& 24 Iowa, 204.
been absent from Iowa between seven and
eight years, six of which were spent in Texas.
But the court held that her domicil still con-
tinued to be in Iowa, because of an ultimate
intention she entertained of sometime return-
ing to Iowa. It will not do to infer, how.
ever, as one easily might from the above case,
that in all cases the cherishing of an ultimate
intention of sometime returning will prevent
the acquiring a new domicil. For instance,
we find the Supreme Court of Missouri as-
serting that a domicil may be changed, al-
though the person on departure cherishes
a secret purpose of returning at some in-
definite time in the future. 9 And in Tennes-
see the court says, that a floating intention to
return at some future period will not defeat
the acquisition of a new domicil.' 0 And in
Massachusetts it is said: "An intention to re-
turn, however, at a remote or indefinite
period, to the former place of actual resi-
dence will not control, if the other facts
which constitute domicil, all. give the new
residence the character of a permanent home
and place of abode."'" So in Maryland we
find the court declaring that the person's pur-
pose "need not be fixed and unalterable" in
order to change his domicil, and that "a
floating intention to return to his former
place of abode at some future periodi' will
not defeat it. 12 So in an English case we find
one of the judges saying: "I think, how-
ever, it appears that he had contemplated the
possibility of returning to India. But is it
to be said that a contingent intention of that
kind defeats the intention which is necessary
to accompany the factum, in order to estab-
lish a domicil? Most assuredly not. There
is not a man who has not contingent inten-
tions to do something that would be very
much to his benefit if the occasion arises.
But if every such intention, or expression of
intention, prevented a' man having a fixed
domicil, no man would ever have a domicil
at all, except his domicil of origin.' 3
This leads us to inquire, under what cir-
cumstances is a domicil of origin lost, and a
9 Johnson v. Smith, 43 Mo. 499.
10 Stratton v. Brigham, 2 Sneed, 420. See, also,
Harris v. Firth, 4 Cranch, C. C. 710.
11 Hallett v. Bassett, 100 Mass. 167..
12 Ringgold v. Barley, 5 bid. 186, 193.
13 Attorney-General v. Pottinger, 0 L. J. Ex. 284,
291.
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domicil of choice acquired? And the answer
to the inquiry is, that a domicil of choice is
acquired by the combination of residence
with the intention of permanently or in-
definitely remaining at the place of residence.
Or, as it is sometimes expressed, there must
concur both the fact of residence (factum),
and the intent (animus manendi). And
where either of these is wanting, a new dom-
icil can not be acquired. 1" There must be a
union of intent and actual bodily presence.
"We are all agreed," said Lord Jeffrey, "that
to constitute a domicil, there must be the fact
of residence, * * * * and also a pur-
pose on the part of (D.) to have continued
that residence. While I say that both must
concur, I say it with equal confidence that
nothing else is necessary."' 1
Where a party sold his homestead in Iowa,
boxed up his household furniture, sent his
family to Kansas with the intent of making
that State his future home, he having remained
in Iowa with the household goods,.it was held
by the Supreme Court of Kansas that, not-
withstanding the intent to make the change,
and notwithstanding the fact that, in pursu-
ance of such intent, the wife and children had
actually arrived in Kansas with trunks con-
taining their personal clothing, no change of
domicil took place, inasmuch as the husband
had not reached the State. "Had the de-
fendant accompanied his wife and children to
Kansas, and remained there, though for ever
so short a time, if long enough to establish
them in a new home, even though such new
home had been a boarding place in the house
of relatives, then indeed the intent might
have been effectual in giving character and
significance to the act. But we cannot think
that the intent of the husband to follow his
family to Kansas at some future time, had the
effect of giving him a legal residence in this
State, months before he had set foot upon her
soil. Intents and purposes are subject to
14 Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 So. App. 441, V7, 458;
Maltass v. Maltass, I Rob. Ece. 67, 78; Jopp v. Wood,
4 De. G., J. & S. 616, 621, 622; Forbes v. Forbes, 23
L. J. (Gb.) 724; MeClerry v. Matson, 2 Ind. 79; Bur-
gess v. Clark, 3 Ind. 250; Hairston v. Hairston, 27
Miss. 704; Adams v. Evans, 19 Kas. 174; Stiles v. Lay,
9 Ala. 795; White v. White, 3 Head, 404; Layne v.
Pardee, 2 Swan, 232; Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick.
870; Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me. 177; Stockton v, Sta-
ples, 66 Me. 197; Ensor v. Graff, 48 Md. 291; Wilkins
v. Marshall, 80 I1. 74.
15 Arnott v. Groom, 0 D. 142.
change, and are seldom to be taken as the
equivalent of substantial deeds." So it was
held that no change of domicil occurred, as
"fact and intent" did not concur.3' On the
other hand, reference may be made to a case
decided in the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts, in which the facts were as follows:
The plaintiff was a shipmaster, whose domicil
of origin was at A, but most of whose time
was spent at sea. In 1867, he left his dom-
icil in A, and'went to sea with his wife, in-
tending to make his" home in the town of B.
In pursuance of this intent he, in 1869, sent
his wife to B, where she arrived in February.
He was not personally present in B,
until July of the same yar, but the
court held that he was domiciled there
as early as May of that year. -"By
sending his wife to B, with the intent to make
it his home, he thereby changed his domicil.
The fact of removal and the intent concurred.
Although he was not personally present, he
established his home there from the time of
his wife's arrival.'' 17 But the rule is, that
an old domicil is not lost, nor a new one
gained, by mere ixtention, unaccompanied by
removal and actual residence.' 8  "A mere in-
tention to remove permanently, without an
actual removal, works no change of domicil;
nor does a mere removal from the State, with-
out an intention to reside elsewhere.' "19
But where a change has actually been made,
animo etfacto, the old domicil is at once lost,
and a new one is gained, at the same time.
"Length of time will not alone do it; inten-
tion alone will not do it, but the two taker
together do constitute a change of domicil.
No particular time is required, but when the
two circumstances of actual residence and
intentional residence concur, then it is that a.
change of domicil is effected." ' 20 And this
intent must be a definitely formed one.2'-
"The time may be shorter or longer, accord-
ing to the circumstances." ' 22  "In all cases,
the question whether a person has or has not
acquired a domicil, must depend mainly upon
his actual or presumed intention. * * -
16 Hart v. Horn, 4 Ras. 232.
17 Bangs v. Brewster, 111 Mass. 885.
18 Maddox v. State, 82 Ind. 111.
19 Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 466,469.
0 Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt. 855, 857.
21 Walker v. Walker, 1 Mo. App. 404.
22 Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 721.
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The apparent or avowed intention, not the
manner of it, constitutes domicil." 23
It was at one time supposed that in order
to work a change of domicil, it was necessary
that the person should intend to change his alle-
giance ; but this cannot be considered to be the
law. "According to one view," says Wick-
ens, V. C., "it is gufficient to show that he
intended to settle in a new country; to estab-
lish his principal or sole and permanent home
there, though the legal consequences of so do-
ing, oil his civil status, mav never have en-
tered his mind. According to the other view,
it is necessary to show that he intended to
change his civil status, to give up his position,
as, for thepurposes of civil status, a citizen of
one country, and to assume a position as, for
the like purposes, the citizen of another. This
stricter view is supported by opinions of
great weight; amongst others, by the Lord
President in Donaldson v. McClure ;24 that of
the Lord Chief Baron Pollock, in Attor-
ney-General v. I)e Wahlstatt, 25' and by
some expressions used by the late Lords
Cranworth and Kingsdown. * * * But I
cannot satisfy myself that the stricter rule, as
I have called it, can be considered as the law
of England. It never was, I believe, the law
of any other country, except, perhaps, Scot-
land, or recognized as law by any of the text-
writers of European authority who have dealt
with questions of domicil; and it is difficult
to believe that the law of England has drifted
so far from the general principles on which it
professed to be founded, and which it always
professed to follow." 26
The rule being that a domicil once acquired
s presumed to continue, 27 it necessarily fol-
lows that where a change of domicil is al-
leged to have been made, the burden of prov-
ing that such a change has been made, rests
upon the party making the allegation. 28 But
the doctrine that a domicil once acquired is
presumed to continue, is said in a recent case
not to prevail when its effect would be to im-
S2 Ibid.
24 20 Sc. Sess. Cases (N. s.) 307.
25 3 11. & C. 374.
26 Douglas v. Douglass, L. R. 12 Eq. 617, 644; see
Udny v. Udny, L. It. 1 Sc. App. 441; Brunel v.
Brunel, L. R. 12 Eq. 298.
27 Glover v. Glover, 18 Ala. 367.
28 Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. St. 106; Ennis v. Smith,
14 How. 400, 422; :Desmare v. United States, 93 U. S.
.10.
pose upon the party the character of an ene-
my to his Government. 29 And in determining
the question of domicil, the declarations of
the party "have always been received in evi-
dence when made previous to the event which
gave rise to the suit. They have been re-
ceived in the courts of Fram:ce, in the courts
of England, and in those of our own coun-
try. ' 30 ' In Hood's Estate,31 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania say: "Where a person
removes to a foreign country, settles himself
there and engages in the trade of the country,
the presumption in favor of the continuance
of the domicil of origin no longer exists." In
a recent case, the same court say that where
a person sells all his real estate, gives up all
his business in the State in which he had
lived, takes his movable property with him
and establishes his home in another State,
such acts, prima facie, prove a change of
domicil. 32
Where a man is the head of a family and a
house-keeper, his domicil is presumed to be
where his family reside.33 But the residence
of a married man's family is not ndeessarily
his domicil. 34 In Ennis v. Smith, 35 the Su-
preme Court of the United States answer the
question as to what amount of proof is neces-
sary to change a domicil of origin into a
primafacie domicil of choice, by saying that
"It is residence elsewhere, or where a person
lives out of the domicil of origin. That re-
pels the presumption of its continuance, and
casts upon him who denies the domicil of
choice, the burden of disproving it. Where a
person lives, is taken, prima facie, to be his
domicil, until other facts establish the contra-
ry. A removal which does not contemplate
an absence from the former domicil for an in-
definite and uncertain time, is not a change of
,it. But when there is a removal, unless it
can be shown or inferred from circumstances
that it was. for some particular purpose, ex-
pected to be only of' a temporary ilature, or
in the exercise of some particular profession,
it does change the domicil. The result is,
29 Stoughton v. Hill, 3 Woods, 14.
30 Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 422, and cases there
cited.
3121 Pa. St. 106, 116.
32 Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 466, 469.
33 Yonkey v. State, 27 Ind. 236.
34 Pearce v. State, 1 Sneed, 6; Exchange Bank v.
Cooper, 40 Mo. 169; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss.
721.
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that the place of residence is, prima facie, the
domicil, unless there be some motive for that
residence not inconsistent with a clearly es-
tablished intention to retain a permanent res-
idence in another place."
The above case of Ennis v. Smith involved
the question of Kosciusko's domicil. It was
urged on the one hand that his domicil was
in France, he having resided there after his
exile from Poland. On the other hand, the
theory was advanced that his domicil still
continued to be in Poland, inasmuch as he was
a forced exile from that country, and had
never abandoned the hope of returning to
Poland when the political condition of the
country should permit him to resume his
rights as a citizen of it. The court held that
he-had a French domicil, as he continued to
remain in France after he could have return-
ed to Poland. Where a residence is purely
compulsory, and is not continued after it
ceases to be compulsory, it seems no domicil
is acquired.36 So, according to Bullenois, the
French jurists regarded the fugitives who ac-
companied James II. to France, as retaining
their English domicil. 37 By the Roman law,
a perpetual exile transferred his domicil to
the place of banishment; but it is said to
have been otherwise when the banishment
was temporary.
8
If a person, having acquired a donicil of
choice, abandons it with the intention of re-
suming his domicil of origin, it is said that
the domicil of origin revives as soon as the
former domicil is abandoned, and before he
arrives at the domicil of origin. 39 But sup-
pose the domicil of choice is abandoned with-
out any intention of resuming the domicil of
origin, and without any definite conclusion
having been reached as to the place of final
settlement? Then the question is presented
whether the domicil of origin revives, or
whether the domicil of choice continues until
the new Aomicil is actually acquired animo et
facto. It seems at first to have been held in
England, that a domicil of choice, like a dom-
ieil of birth, was retained until another was
35 14 How. 400, 422.
3G De Bonneval v. De Bonneval, 1 Curt. 856, 864.
37 Traite de la Realite et Personalte des Statuts, t.
1, til. ii.. e. 3.
38L. 22, § 3; L. 27, § 3; See Merlin Rep. de Jur.
Dom. iv.
39 Allen v. Thomason, 11 Humph. 536. See White v.
Brown, 1 Wall. Jr. 217, 265.
actually acquired. That where A, whose dom-
icil of origin was English, had a domicil of
choice in France, he continued to retain his
French domicil, notwithstanding he had left
France for good, having no intention of re-
turning to England, or of settling in any
country whatever. That, as a matter of law,
his French domicil of choice continued until
he settled in fact in some other country, in-
tending to remain there permanently. 40 The
English courts, however, have since aban-
doned this view of the law, and it is now laid
down that a domicil of choice is abandoned
when the individual leaves his adopted coun-
try, with no intention of again returning to
permanently reside therein, and that he there-
upon resumes the domicil of origin, which
continues as his domicil until he actually set-
tles in another State or country, thereby ac-
quiring a new domicil of choice. 4 ' 0
We may be allowed, owing both to the im-
pbrtance of the question, as well as to the prev-
alent uncertainty in reference to it, to quote
the following from Lord Westbury's opinion
in the case last above cited: "Expressions
are found in some books," he says, "and in
one or two cases, that the first or existing
domicil remains until another is ac4 uired. This
is true if applied to the domicil of origin, but
cannot be true if such general words were in-
tended (which is not probable) to convey the
conclusion that a domicil of choice, though
unequivocally relinquished and abandoned,
clings, in despite of his will and acts, to the
party, until another domicil has, animo etfacto,
been acquired. The cases to which I have
referred are, in my opinion, met and con-
trolled by other decisions. A natural-born
Englishman may, if he domicils himself in
Holland, acquire and have the status civilis of
a Dutchman, which is of course ascribed to
him in respect of his settled abode in the
land; but if he breaks up his establishment,
sells his house an4 furniture, discharges his
servants and quits Holland, declaring that he
will never return to it again, and taking with
him his wife and children for the purpose
of traveling in France or Italy in search of
another place of residence, is it meant to be
said that he carries his Dutch domicil, that is,
his Dutch citizenship, at his back, and that it
40 Munroe v. Douglas, 5 Madd. 379.
41 See Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Se. App. 441.
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clings to him pertinaciously until he has final-
ly set up his tabernacle in another country?
Such a conclusion would be absurd; bat there
is no absurdity, and, on the contrary, much
reason in holding that an acquired domicil
may be effectually abandoned by unequivocal
intention and act; and that when it is so de-
termined, the domicil of origin revives, until
a new domicil of choice be acquired. Accord-
ing to the dicta in the books and cases re-
ferred to, if the Englishman whose case we
have been supposing, lived for twenty years
after he had finally quitted Holland, without
acquiring a new domicil, and afterwards died
intestate, his personal estate would be admin-
istered according to the law of Holland, and
not according to that of his native country.
This is an irrational consequence of the shp-
posed rule. But when a proposition, supposed
to be authorized by one or more decisions,
involves absurd results, there is great reason
for believing that no such rule was intended
to be laid down." The Supreme Court of
Connecticut draws a distinction, and says that
this principle has no application when the
question is between a native and an acquired
domicil, where both are under the same na-
tional jurisdiction. 42 This decision is based
upon Munroe v. Douglas, supra, which was
overruled in Uday v. Udny, supra. We do
not think, however, that the court ever in-
tended, in Munroe v. Douglas, to sanction the
conclusion reached in Connecticut, as Sir
John Leach expressly declared that he could
"find no difference between an original dom-
ieil and an acquired domicil." All that was
decided in that case was, that an acquired
domicil would be retained until another was
in fact acquired, and that the domicil of or-
igin would not revert.
I IHENRY WADE ROGES.
CITY ORDINANCES AFFECTING STREET
RAILROADS.
While the authority for the construction of
street railroads is derived from the legislature of
the State, they are subject to the control of the
municipal corporation, where not otherwise pre-
scribed for by the acts of incorporation.
That they have not the exclusive right to the
£treets over other vehicles, is well settled; that
they have not the exclusive right to the use of the
4 First Nat. Bank r. Balcom;n 35 Conn. 851.
streets over other street railroads, is also estab-
lished law. It was laid down in an early
case, (The Brooklyn, etc. B. Co. v. Brook-
lyn City R. Co., 33 Barb. 420, 1861), that
when the rails of a company were constructed, so
as to cover the line of another road, no in-
junction could be obtained to restrain the one
company from crossing the track of another, as
it was held not to be an appropriation ofthe
property by the former company, but a nmode of
exercising the public right of travel over a high-
way; and in subsequent cases (The Brooklyn
City, etc. R. Co. v. The Coney Island, etc.
R. Co. 35 Barb. 364, 1861; The New York, etc.
R. Co. v. Forty-second St., etc. R. Co. 50 Barb.
285), a similar doctrine was established, where it
was declared that street railroads had not the
exclusive right to the use of the streets over
other street railroad companies.
But one company has not the right to the use of
the tracks of another without the consent of the
former, or the authority of the legislature there-
for decreeing compensation to the company.
Sixth Ave. R. Co. v. Kerr, 45 Barb. 138
(1864) ; Metropolitan R. Co. v. Quincy R. Co. 12
Allen, 262 (1866); Jersey City, etc. R. Co. v.
Jersey City, etc. R. Co. 20 N. J. Eq. 61
(1869). The law upon the subject of the right of
a company to the use of the streets was laid
down in a recent case corroborating the
above decisions. In that case the authority
for the construction of a street railway was
given by the legislature over such streets
as the city council and company would agree
upon; and by contract with the company the city
authorized it to build and operate railways on
certain designated streets. Subsequently another
road was incorporated with power Mnd privileges
similar to those of the former, and commenced to
construct tracks upon some of the streets em-
braced in the contract between the city and the
former company. An injunction being asked to
restrain such construction was denied by the
chancellor, who held that neither the charter of
the company, nor the contract with the city, gave
the company the sole and exclusive right to build
and operate railways on those streets, and no such
exclusive right could be implied; the streets were
dedicated to the use of the public, and the leg-
.islature could not be presumed to have intended
to give any individual, whether natural or artifi-
cial, the right to use them in a particular way, to
the exclusion of such other persons as it might see
proper afterwards to permit to use them in a sim-
ilar manner. Covington St. R. Co. v. Covington,
etc.St. R. Co., 11 Cent. L. J. No. 17, 10 Ky. Add.17.
How far and in what manner a city corporation
may regulate the control of street railroads, may
be gathered from the terms of the charter of
incorporation, or in the absence of conditions, from
adjudicated cases.
It therefore has no power to authorize the exten-
sion of a city railroad, unless such extension is
necessary to the enjoyment of a previously valid
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